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Abstract— Many of the world’s major financial markets are 
electronic, in the sense that all communication among traders 
and internal record-keeping at exchanges is entirely mediated 
and executed by digital computer systems and associated 
communications networks; and many such markets are also 
highly automated, in the sense that they are heavily populated by 
automatic algorithmic trading system which have largely 
replaced human traders at the point of execution in many spot 
markets. This has created significant demand for people skilled 
in writing and managing algorithmic trading systems. To 
provide a complete education and training in this field it is 
highly desirable to allow students/trainees to study the operation 
of their own algorithmic trading systems running live on a real 
financial exchange, interacting dynamically with other 
automated traders. This paper describes the Bristol Stock 
Exchange (BSE), a simulator designed and developed to meet 
that need. BSE provides a full implementation of the Limit 
Order Book (LOB) at the heart of modern financial exchanges, 
and includes reference implementations of several well-known 
leading algorithmic trading systems. BSE allows users to submit 
a variety of order-types including market, limit, fill-or-kill, time-
to-live, immediate-or-cancel, iceberg; orders for specific actions 
at market-open and market-close; and linked pairs of 
contingent orders. BSE can be configured to allow empirical 
studies of issues in order routing between multiple exchanges 
and the performance of cross-market arbitrage trading 
algorithms. BSE also has provision for varying the exchange’s 
fee structure, including implementing maker-taker and taker-
maker pricing models, The Python source-code for BSE, which 
has been under ongoing development and extension since 2012, 
along with extensive documentation, is freely available on the 
GitHub online public repository, and can be used as a public-
domain platform for teaching and research.  
Keywords— Simulation for education & training; Financial 
Engineering; Financial Markets; Trading Technology; 
Algorithmic Trading; Limit Order Book; Market Simulator.  
I. INTRODUCTION  
   Present-day global financial markets are heavily 
populated by automated algorithmic trading systems, 
computerized systems largely replacing human traders at the 
point of execution. This is true now for all major markets 
around the world, whether for equities, currencies, 
commodities, fixed-income debt contracts, and for derivative 
contracts on all these classes of tradeable asset. Algorithmic 
trading systems, often referred to as “robot traders” or simply 
as “algos” (see e.g. [1]) perform the roles that were 
traditionally done by highly-paid human traders, but are 
capable of analyzing huge quantities of data and reacting in 
tiny fractions of the time required by human traders.  
There is significant demand for people skilled in the art of 
writing algorithmic trading systems, who typically need to be 
not only highly numerate but also experienced in devising 
algorithms than can execute quickly and reliably: in highly 
automated markets, a speed advantage can be crucial, and this 
has motivated the development of high-frequency trading 
(HFT) systems which are refined to the nearest millisecond 
of execution time and can enter into and out of transactions 
on sub-second timescales. The rise of HFT in modern 
financial markets has proven to be a contentious issue (see, 
e.g. [2, 3, 24, 22, 26]) and has also been the subject of detailed 
academic studies indicating the dynamics of current markets 
may be significantly different from the dynamics of markets 
in times past, when most or all traders in the markets were 
humans (see e.g. [19, 7]). 
Regardless of the controversy over HFT, there is a heavy 
demand among investment banks and investment fund-
management companies for algo-trading “talent”, i.e. for 
employees who are skilled in the design, implementation, and 
ongoing refinement of algo-trading systems. At the 
University of Bristol, a leading UK university, graduates 
from our computer science undergraduate and postgraduate 
degrees are keenly sought for such roles, and our students are 
very keen to learn appropriate skills and knowledge. This 
presents a challenge to us as educators: to provide a complete 
education in this field it is highly desirable to allow our 
students to learn by studying the operation of their own 
algorithmic trading systems running live on a real financial 
exchange, interacting with other automated traders. In an 
ideal world, students would be provided with the means (both 
technical and financial) to launch their own algo traders into 
real financial markets and to observe them trading “live”, but 
this is simply not practicable: in addition to the obvious 
concern that a badly-programmed algo could lose a lot of 
money very fast; there are regulatory obstacles. 
To address this need, I have developed a simple, minimal, 
yet accurate implementation of a financial exchange, 
designed specifically for teaching university-level students 
about how contemporary exchanges work and also to offer a 
platform on which the behavior of our students’ own algo 
trading systems could be realistically evaluated. As is 
explained later in this paper, this type of simulator offers 
experiences that cannot be gained from simply working with 
time-series of historical trade data. The simulation platform 
is named the Bristol Stock Exchange (BSE). BSE offers an 
accurate simulation of the Limit Order Book (LOB), the core 
technology at the heart of modern financial exchanges, 
explained in detail below, and includes illustrative examples 
of several well-known algo trading strategies. BSE has been 
constructed to be easy for students to understand, and easy 
for students to extend by adding their own algo-trader 
program code. The motivation for constructing BSE came 
from earlier experiences with other more complex market 
simulations that had been constructed and used by postdocs 
and PhD students in my research group such as Open 
Exchange [11, 12] and Exchange Portal [29, 30]. BSE has 
been in development and ongoing use since 2012, when its 
source-code and extensive documentation were first made 
available as free-to-use open-source on the GitHub public 
repository. This paper describes the core concepts in BSE, its 
design and implementation, and gives case-studies of its use 
in masters-level Computer Science teaching and research at 
University of Bristol. 
II. THE BSE LIMIT ORDER BOOK (LOB) 
The LOB is at the heart of many contemporary electronic 
exchanges including major national exchanges such as NYSE 
or NASDAQ in the USA, LSE in the UK, and other 
comparable exchanges around the world. In real exchanges, 
independent LOBs will be maintained for each of hundreds 
or thousands of tradeable assets. In the spirit of simplifying 
minimalism, BSE can be configured to offer only a single 
LOB, for a sole anonymous tradeable asset.  
The LOB is a record, a data-structure, that updates in real-
time. Changes in the LOB occur as traders in the market issue 
orders (also known as quotes) to the exchanges. 
Fundamentally, quotes are either asks (a.k.a. offers), i.e. 
orders to sell; or bids, i.e. orders to buy. Orders need to 
specify the trader’s desired price per unit, and the number of 
units (the quantity, also referred to as size, or volume) that the 
trader wishes to transact. Orders may specify that the trader 
is willing to take the best available price currently available, 
known as a market order, or may instead specify a limit price: 
the maximum bid-price at which the trader is prepared to buy, 
or the minimum ask-price for a sale. Because the limit price 
specified in a trader’s quote may be some way distant from 
the prices at which transactions are currently occurring, 
quotes are added to the LOB and aggregated together to give 
an indication of current levels of supply and demand in the 
market over a range of possible prices. Discussion of the 
order types available in BSE is given in Section III, below.  
The LOB is divided into the bid side and the ask side. 
Each side shows a table of quote-prices and the total quantity 
available at that price, i.e. aggregated over all orders at that 
price. Both sides of the LOB are arranged top-to-bottom 
ordered best-to-worst, which means that the bid side is sorted 
in descending order of price while the ask side is sorted in 
ascending order of price. The difference between the best bid 
and the best ask is known as the bid-ask spread, usually 
referred to simply as the spread. The arithmetic mean of the 
best bid and ask, the mid-point of the spread, is known as the 
midprice and is commonly used as single-value indicator of 
current/likely market price, although as is pointed out in [6, 
Ch.1], a more informative measure known as the microprice 
also takes account of the quantities available at the best bid 
and ask prices: BSE re-computes the microprice after each 
update to the LOB. BSE traders can signal that they wish to 
accept the LOB’s current best bid or best ask by issuing a 
market order, or by issuing any other type of quote that 
crosses the spread, i.e. to quote an ask priced at less than the 
current best bid (referred to as hitting the bid), or to quote a 
bid priced at more than the current best ask (referred to as 
lifting the ask). BSE, like real-world exchanges, allows 
traders to cancel any specific quote, and for the exchange to 
charge a cancellation fee. Like real-world exchanges, BSE 
writes a sequential record of time-stamped market events to a 
list data-structure referred to as the market’s tape, which is 
conventionally shown in most-recent-first order. 
Figure 1 shows an illustrative sequence of six frames as 
the LOB is updated to reflect a sequence of incoming orders. 
Each frame has LOB data on the left-hand side (LHS) and a 
graph on the right-hand side (RHS). The LHS of each frame 
shows at upper left, in red text, the time, prefaced with “T:”; 
immediately below that, in green text, is the current 
microprice which displays as “M: -- --” if there is currently not 
enough data on the LOB to compute the microprice. At LHS 
upper center, in yellow, are details of the most recently 
processed quote. Below that, at center LHS, is the LOB: a 
table showing the current array of bid and ask prices, with 
corresponding quantities: bid-side on the right (quantities 
followed by prices); ask-side on the right (prices followed by 
quantities). Below the LOB, at LHS bottom, the two most 
recent events on BSE’s tape are displayed. The RHS graph in 
each frame shows the market supply and demand curves 
derived from the LOB at that instant. As is conventional, these 
graphs show price along the vertical axis and quantity along 
the horizontal axis. The supply curve, a dashed blue line, steps 
upwards while the demand curve, a solid red line, steps 
downwards. Unlike the simplifications shown in academic 
textbooks on microeconomics, the supply and demand curves 
are manifestly not smooth curves or straight lines, and the 
equilibrium point P (where the supply and demand curves 
meet) never appears on the graphs because, if ever it did, that 
would indicate that a trader had issued a quote that crosses or 
touches the spread, and a transaction would then instantly 
occur, eliminating P from the graph. Instead, the green cross 
on the vertical axis of the RHS graph is the current microprice. 
The last two frames in Figure 1(at 00:27 and 00:30) result in a 
transaction because the incoming quote crosses the spread: the 
transaction price, quantity, and time are written to the tape for 
each transaction that occurs. 
III. ORDER TYPES IN BSE 
Traders interacting with the BSE LOB can submit a 
variety of types of order, explained in more detail below. In 
the simplest use-case, all traders in BSE can be restricted to 
issuing only limit orders: if the price of a limit order does not 
cross the spread then it is added to the appropriate side of the 
LOB, adding liquidity to the market (i.e., being a “liquidity 
maker”). However if it does cross the spread then it is treated 
as if it was instead a market order, immediately consuming 
(hitting or lifting) orders at the top of the counterparty side of 
the LOB, thereby being a “liquidity taker”. This minimal 
usage is sufficient for replicating the various well-known 
prior trading-agent studies discussed in Section VI.  
The additional order-types in BSE are common in most 
financial markets. When there are multiple orders all to be 
processed, orders of the same type are sorted by arrival time 
(i.e., the time the order was issued to the exchange) and are 
dealt with in age-order, first-come-first-served. When 
pending orders are of different types, they are dealt with in 
priority-sequence depending on their type. The BSE order-
types are described here in order of decreasing priority. The 
order types currently implemented in BSE, and their 
associated three-letter acronyms are: market orders (MKT); 
limit orders (LIM); good-for-day (GFD); fill-or-kill (FOK); 
all-or-nothing (AON); immediate-or-cancel (IOC); and 
iceberg orders (ICE). There are also four special types of order 
that are operational only at the start and end of a trading 
session, i.e. at market-open and at market-close. These are: 
market-on-open (MOO); market-on-close (MOC); limit-on-
open (LOO); and limit-on-close (LOC). Finally, linked pairs 
of orders can be submitted with conditions specifying what 
should be done with the second order, depending on what 
happens to the first order: these are known as one-cancels-
other (OCO) and one-sends-other (OSO) orders. The order-
types are explained in sequence below.  
 
 
Figure 1: Six frames from an illustrative series of updates to the BSE LOB, 
from time=00:15 to time=00:30. Trades occur at 00:27 and 00:30, because 
the incoming quote crosses the spread: the most recent trade is written to the 
front of the tape. See text for further explanation and discussion. 
 
In the descriptions that follow, p denotes the price specified 
in the order and q denotes the quantity (also known referred 
to as the size or the volume) specified in the order. The total 
quantity available on the counterparty side of the LOB (i.e. 
bid-side for an ask order, or the ask-side for a bid order) at 
prices better than or equal to p is denoted by QPRICE, and 
QTOTAL denotes the total quantity on the counterparty side of 
the LOB over all available prices. 
A. Market Order (MKT) 
MKT orders for quantity q execute at the current best 
available  price, whatever that is, taking the best orders from 
the top of the relevant side of the LOB: a Bid-MKT lifts the 
q best-priced units on the ask side of the book; an Ask-MKT 
hits the q best-priced units on the bid-side. If q > QTOTAL, the 
unfulfilled portion of the MKT order, of quantity q–QTOTAL, 
is ignored. In BSE any limit orders with a price that cross the 
spread are executed as MKT. Variations on MKT, 
constrained by price p and specifying how the order is 
processed when q>QPRICE, are available in the other BSE 
liquidity-taking order-types FOK, AON, and IOC. 
B. Limit Order (LIM) 
LIM orders are added to the LOB in the manner described 
previously: if the LIM order’s price crosses the spread, it 
executes as MKT; if not, it is added to the LOB 
C. Good-for-Day Order (GFD) 
GFD orders are time-limited LIMs: they are deleted from 
the LOB at the end of the trading “day”, i.e. when the market 
session closes and accepts no more orders. 
D. Fill-or-Kill Order (FOK) 
A FOK order only executes if it can be immediately filled 
in full, consuming q units from the orders currently available 
on the counterparty side of the LOB at prices better than or 
equal to the price p of the FOK order: if that is not possible, 
the order is ignored: FOK orders do not partially fill.  
E. All-or-Nothing Order (AON) 
AON orders are similar to FOK orders. Whereas a FOK 
order specifies an immediate transaction, an AON order will 
sit on the exchange for a specified duration, waiting for the 
situation to arise where there is enough volume on the other 
side of the book for the AON to execute; if at the end of the 
duration the AON has not executed, the order is ignored. 
F. Immediate-or-Cancel Order (IOC) 
IOC orders differ from FOK orders by allowing partial 
fulfillment: if an IOC order of quantity q cannot be filled in 
full at prices at least as good as p because the LOB has 
QPRICE<q, the transaction goes through at quantity QPRICE and 
the remaining order at quantity (q–QPRICE) is ignored.   
G. Iceberg Order (ICE) 
ICE orders specify what maximum quantity qdisp for the 
order is displayed on the LOB: an ICE order of size q 
(typically q>>qdisp) is automatically split into a sequence of 
LIM sub-orders of size qdisp. As each sub-order is filled, the 
total remaining order-size qrem is decremented by qdisp, and for 
each successive sub-order if qrem>=qdisp then another sub-
order is issued, again for size qdisp; and when 0<=qrem<qdisp 
the final LIM sub-order is issued with size qrem.  
H. Limit-on-Close Order (LOC) 
When the current market session closes, if the limit price 
specified on a LOC bid order is equal to or greater than the 
closing best bid price, then the LOC bid executes; similarly 
for a LOC ask order, if the limit price is equal to or less than 
the closing best ask price, the LOC ask executes. If a LOC 
does not execute on market-close, it is automatically 
cancelled. LOC orders do not show on the LOB before close.  
I. Market-on-Close Order (MOC) 
MOC orders are MKT orders set to trigger immediately 
as the market trading session closes.  
J. Limit-on-Open Order (LOO) 
LOO orders can be issued in the current trading session, 
and rest at the exchange until the instant at which the market 
opens for the next trading session, when they are immediately 
issued as LIM orders, and processed appropriately. 
K. Market-on-Open Order (MOO) 
MOO orders can be issued in the current trading session, 
and rest at the exchange until the instant at which the market 
opens for the next trading session, when they are immediately 
processed as MKT orders. 
L. One-Cancels-Other Order (OCO) 
An OCO order involves a linked pair of constituent orders 
OA and OB: both are processed by the exchange and the LOB 
updated accordingly, in such a way that OA executes then OB 
is immediately cancelled, and vice versa. If both OA and OB 
could execute then only OA does so.  
M. One-Sends-Other Order (OSO) 
OSO orders also involve a linked pair of orders OA and 
OB: OA is processed first and, when it executes, OB is then 
immediately sent for processing/execution. If OA doesn’t 
execute, then nor does OB. 
N. Cancel Order (CAN) and Exit Market (XXX). 
Traders in BSE can cancel earlier orders that are still live 
on BSE, i.e. still awaiting matching with a counterparty. Each 
time a trader issues an order to the exchange, BSE responds 
with a unique order-identification code (OIC) for that order; 
so long as the order has not yet executed, a trader can 
subsequently send a CAN order, along with the OIC of the 
order to be cancelled: this removes that specific order from 
the BSE LOB and associated records. Each CAN order is 
written to the BSE tape. A trader can also send BSE an XXX 
order, which instructs BSE to cancel all of that trader’s 
outstanding orders from the exchange’s records. BSE 
implements this by issuing a sequence of individual CAN 
orders, and it is these that are written to the tape (that is, the 
single XXX order is not written to the tape). 
IV. BSE EXCHANGE FEES  
Real-world financial exchanges typically charge a range 
of fees for accepting and processing an order, with the precise 
amount charged depending on the nature of the order. Even 
cancellations of prior orders incur a fee on some exchanges. 
Devising trading strategies that are profitable in the face of 
such exchange transaction costs is an important aspect of 
working as a designer of automated trading systems. 
Historically it was common for the transaction fee to be 
calculated as a percentage of the order’s total value (i.e., the 
per-unit transaction-price multiplied by the size/quantity of 
the order), with a “bulk discount” so that the percentage fee 
falls as the size of the order increases. In recent years, major 
exchanges have introduced so-called maker-taker fee 
structures where “maker” traders who provide liquidity to the  
market by posting limit orders away from the best price are 
given preferential treatment, in the form of reduced fees or 
even payments from the exchange; while “taker” traders 
viewed as removing liquidity from the  market by hitting the 
bid or lifting the ask pay a higher fee than the makers: see e.g. 
[6, Ch.1] for further discussion. BSE is written in such a way 
that maker-taker (or the converse, taker-maker) fee/rebate 
systems can easily be implemented and explored.  
V. MULTIPLE EXCHANGES 
Although initially intended to offer the functionality 
associated with an individual financial exchange, BSE has 
been architected and implemented in such a way, using 
object-oriented Python, that it is trivially easy to create 
multiple exchanges all operating simultaneously. Having 
multiple exchanges in simultaneous operation offers 
opportunities for studying important aspects of contemporary 
financial markets such as smart order routing to ensure orders 
are executed at the best price available across multiple trading 
venues; and cross-market arbitrage where arbitrageur traders 
exploit discrepancies in prices between two or more trading 
venues, and/or make profitable use of differences in 
communications latencies between multiple markets (see e.g. 
[14, 37]).  
VI. ALGORITHMIC “ROBOT TRADERS” IN BSE 
The class of algorithmic “robot” traders implemented in 
BSE are known technically as automated execution systems. 
That is, the robot trader is assigned an order to execute, with 
the intention of maximizing margin on that order. This is a 
role that was previously performed by humans, known as 
sales traders. Orders come in from an external source and are 
commonly referred to as client orders. To better distinguish 
between a client order that a trader has been assigned to 
execute, and any orders that the trader sends to an exchange, 
client orders are referred to here as assignments. Assignments 
are typically one of the types of order defined previously in 
Section III. Market orders and any spread-crossing limit 
orders execute immediately, but other orders are added to the 
BSE internal records, typically showing on the LOB as quotes 
from the trader attempting to execute its assignment. The 
opportunity for a trader to make a profit comes if that trader 
can arrange a deal at less than the limit-price specified by the 
client order: so if the client asks to buy 1000 shares at a limit 
price of no more than $140, the trader has a profit opportunity 
if he or she or it can instead secure a transaction at a price of 
$138, saving $2000; similarly when executing a client order 
to sell 1000 shares at a limit price of no less than $150, if the 
trader can secure a deal at $155 there is a potential profit of 
$5000. The difference between the limit price and the 
transaction price is the trader’s margin on that deal, usually 
expressed as a percentage of the limit price. Human sales 
traders would typically be working multiple client orders at 
any one time, and by acting as an intermediary they provide 
an anonymization service too. In recent years, human sales 
traders in the global financial markets have been almost 
entirely replaced by automated execution systems: “robot 
traders” or “algos”.      
This transition to automated algo trading systems has 
been enabled by roughly 25 years of research into what it 
takes to create a machine that can trade as well as a human, 
or better. That field of research has produced a small number 
of algorithmic trading strategies (originated by different 
authors, some working in microeconomics, others working in 
artificial intelligence and machine learning) which now form 
something of a de facto set of commonly-used benchmark 
algorithms, used for example when evaluating new trading 
strategies. The BSE GitHub repository includes source-code 
for the following trading algorithms, and their associated 
trader-code within BSE (an acronym or contraction of up to 
four characters) listed here in chronological order of first 
being reported in the literature: Sniper (SNPR): inspired by 
Kaplan’s prize-winning trading algorithm as described in 
[27]; Zero Intelligence Constrained (ZIC) introduced by 
Gode & Sunder [16]; Zero Intelligence Plus (ZIP: [8]); and 
Vytelingum’s Adaptive Aggressive (AA) [35, 36]. The AA 
algorithm was later demonstrated in [11] to be the dominant 
strategy among those known in the public domain: 
outperforming not only all other public-domain algo trading 
strategies, but also out-performing human traders. However, 
[34] questions that claim, and recently BSE has been used as 
the test-bed for sequences of millions of simulated market 
sessions, discussed briefly in Section IX below, which cast 
further doubt on AA’s dominance.   
A notable omission from this list is the trading strategy 
first published by [15], and known as GD. This, operating in 
a modified form (Modified-GD or simply MGD), was 
demonstrated in 2001 by a team of IBM researchers [10] to 
be one of two automated trading algorithms that could 
consistently outperform human traders in a series of 
controlled laboratory experiments; the other trading 
algorithm that outperformed human traders in the IBM study 
was ZIP. MGD was subsequently [31] extended into a 
strategy known as GDX. GD/MGD/GDX are not included in 
the standard distribution of BSE purely so that students using 
BSE as a learning environment can be given the exercise of 
writing their own GD-derived traders.  
BSE also includes samples of two extremely simple 
trading strategies, added purely as introductory illustration of 
how trading agents can be written to interact with BSE. These 
are: Giveaway (GVWY), a robot trader that ignores the LOB 
and instead immediately sets its quote price to exactly the 
same as its given limit-price, thereby surrendering any hope 
of making a profit on the trade but nevertheless maximizing 
its chances of finding a counterparty; and Shaver (SHVR) 
which reads data from the LOB and immediately sets its 
quote price to one penny (i.e. 0.01, the smallest unit of 
currency) less/more than the current best ask/bid when 
working a sell/buy order, stopping when its current quote is 
at the order’s limit price.   
VII. SUPPLY AND DEMAND SCHEDULES 
To fully specify a market experiment in BSE, as with any 
study in experimental economics, it is necessary to specify 
the nature of the supply and demand curves in the experiment. 
High-school microeconomics tells us that the intersection of 
the supply and demand curves is the equilibrium point, the 
ordinates of which are the theoretical equilibrium price P0  
and equilibrium quantity Q0 for the market at that time. 
Studies in experimental economics typically concentrate on 
the speed and extent to which the transaction prices in the 
market converge on the underlying P0  value, and the degree 
of variation in transaction prices measured relative to P0. 
In classic works from the experimental economics 
literature such as Smith’s original paper on his first ever 
experiments [28] or Gode and Sunder’s landmark zero-
intelligence-trader paper [16], the shape and nature of the 
supply and demand curves, i.e. the supply and demand 
schedule (SDS), were decided a priori as part of the 
experiment design, and typically remained fixed for the 
duration of each experiment. If there was any change in the 
SDS, it was typically a single “market shock” where partway 
through an experiment the SDS that had been in play since 
the start of the experiment was replaced by a second SDS, 
one that differed from the first, which then remained in play 
until the end of the experiment. This allowed the response of 
the market to the shock-change in SDS to be recorded and 
analyzed. Such shock-change SDSs were also used to 
evaluate the response of algo trading strategies such as ZIP 
[8] and AA [35,36].  
In BSE it is possible to specify a single SDS that remains 
static for the duration of an experiment, or to specify one or 
more shock-changes, jumping from one SDS to another, in 
the duration of an experiment. However, because real markets 
tend very rarely (arguably never) to have a static equilibrium 
price, and because sudden step changes in supply and/or 
demand do happen but are typically exceptional events, BSE 
also allows for the SDS to vary continuously over time. In the 
simplest case, the experimenter using BSE can specify an 
equilibrium offset function EO(t) that specifies a value at 
time t that is thereafter added to limit prices on trader 
assignments shifting the supply and demand curves up or 
down equally, without changing any other aspect of the SDS. 
Figure 2 illustrates a case in which the EO(t) function is 
periodic, defined by a simple periodic mathematical function.  
BSE allows EO(t) functions to be defined as closed-form 
mathematical functions as illustrated in Figure 2, or as look-
up-tables (LUTs). Using a LUT for EO(t) makes it possible 
to have the value of P0 in an experiment be driven from a 
time-series of real market-data, such as intraday transaction 
prices or midprices for a specific equity or currency-pair. In 
such a use-case, the BSE underlying equilibrium price will 
vary over time in the same way as the real tradeable security, 
but the actions of the traders within the BSE experimental 
market can still have effects on the market’s supply and 
demand, and hence on the subsequent price dynamics in the 
market.  
 
Figure 2: Continuously-varying supply-and-demand-schedules (SDSs). The 
upper graph shows an example continuously varying equilibrium offset 
function, where the equilibrium offset price is a function of time t: here the 
offset function is periodic, a triangle wave with a frequency of 0.1Hz, 
illustrated by the dashed blue line. Three points on the line have been 
highlighted; A at time t=5.0sec; B at t=20sec; and C at t=27.5sec. The lower 
three graphs show the supply and demand schedule in the market at points 
A, B, and C respectively: the underlying theoretical equilibrium price P0 (to 
which transaction prices are expected to converge) is $2.00 at A, $1.00 at B, 
and $1.50 at C, but other than these vertical shifts caused by changes in the 
offset value, the shapes of the supply and demand curves remain unchanged.  
 
BSE’s specification of SDSs also allows for degrees of 
random jitter to be added the prices in the SDS; and for the 
arrival times of new assignments to either be simultaneously 
replenished for all traders (as is common in past experimental 
economics studies such as [28, 16, 8, 35, 36]), or to arrive as 
a nondeterministic stream, with the BSE experimenter having 
the ability to choose/define the stochastic process that 
governs arrival times of new assignments. Both the random 
jitter and the assignment arrival-times are under full control 
of the experimenter; complete details of specifying SDSs in 
BSE are given in the BSE documentation on GitHub.1   
Figure 3 illustrates a time-series of transaction prices in a 
BSE market populated by 40 traders working buy orders and 
40 traders working sell orders, with the flow of client orders 
specifically structured to give a P0 that varies sinusoidally 
over time. The theoretical value of P0 is shown by the solid 
line, and it can be seen that the transaction prices of the 
traders in the market are closely following the underlying P0, 
with some lag determined by the time it takes for interactions 
among the traders engaged in price-discovery to reflect the 
change in P0.  
VIII.  USING BSE IN UNIVERSITY TEACHING 
Since its first release as open-source on GitHub in 2012, 
BSE has been used successfully as the platform for 
illustrating various issues in trading technology in taught 
modules/units on MSc and MEng degrees at the University 
of Bristol. The source-code of BSE serves as an illustrative 
reference implementation showing how the core mechanism 
in a LOB-based exchange operates, and the various algo-
trader strategies pre-coded into BSE also offer reference 
implementations so that students can study how  descriptions 
of trading algorithms are translate into working program 
code: the lack of such reference implementations in the 
original source literature has been highlighted in [33] as a 
major obstacle to subsequent replication studies.  
To keep things simple when students are first learning to 
use BSE, limits can be imposed so that all quotes have a fixed 
quantity of size 1, and so that each trader can only have one 
quote on the LOB: if a trader already has a quote on the LOB 
then the next time that trader issues a quote, its new quote 
replaces the old one. This simplified style of LOB in BSE is 
consistent with the stripped-down minimalism of Smith’s 
initial pioneering studies in experimental economics [28] 
where similar simplifying constraints were introduced, 
establishing a tradition that has continued to present-day 
practice in experimental economics research (see e.g. [20, 21, 
9]). The BSE platform has been used as the basis for 
coursework assessments where students are required to write 
their own trading algorithms, embed those algorithms into a 
trading agent on BSE, and empirically evaluate their 
algorithmic trader via an appropriately structured series of 
experiment and trials: this motivates the students to also learn 
generic skills in the design of experiments and in the 
statistical analysis of noisy empirical data. 
A number of our masters-level (MEng and MSc) students 
have also used BSE as the basis for the major project that each 
student independently works on and documents in their 
individual master’s thesis; a recent one of these has resulted 
in a publication in an international peer-reviewed academic 
conference [5]. The discussion here will focus on past use of 
BSE in teaching masters-level computer science students; 
however we intend, in early 2019, to roll out the use of BSE 
in new teaching content currently being developed, on the use 
of advanced data analytics in economics, finance, and 
management.  
BSE was developed to give students experience of 
experimenting with automated algo-trading systems active in 
a market where those algo traders could themselves 
                                                        
1 BSE GitHub site is https://github.com/davecliff/BristolStockExchange.  
individually affect, and collectively determine, the trajectory 
of transaction prices over time. This is not possible when 
working with traditional financial-market simulators that 
simply regurgitate historical time series of transaction prices 
from a “tape”, a database of asset prices over time. In a real 
market, if a large number of traders decide to sell their 
holdings of a specific asset (or, equivalently, if a single trader 
decides to sell a very large quantity of a single asset) then, all 
other things being equal, the increased supply of that asset 
into the market will depress the price. Traders working 
sufficiently large order-sizes need to be mindful of this 
because sometimes, merely revealing their intention to buy or 
sell a large quantity of an asset can result in the price that 
trader is offered being different from the best market price 
currently shown on the LOB or the time-series of transaction 
prices, as potential counterparties change their view of what 
the a fair price should be now, in anticipation of the change 
in price that will result once the large deal goes through. This 
effect is known as market impact: very many automated 
trading systems have to deal with market impact. Manifestly, 
market impact cannot be experienced when working solely 
from historical data tapes: the price of the asset at the time 
immediately after execution of a large trade in that asset will 
be whatever historical price is written on the tape, regardless 
of the quantity just traded whether it is for a quantity of one, 
or one million.  
 
 
 
 
  
Figure 3: transaction price time-series from a BSE market where the 
constant stochastic arrival of client orders into the market is deliberately 
structured to give supply and demand schedules where the theoretical 
equilibrium price varies over time, following a sinusoidal path that grows 
in amplitude, indicated by the solid blue line. Horizontal axis is time in 
seconds; vertical axis is price. This market is populated with 40 buyers and 
40 sellers, each group divided into 10 GVWY traders, 10 SHVR, 10 ZIC, 
and 10 ZIP; the crosses show individual transaction prices. See text for 
further discussion.  
 
Over the years 2012-15 BSE was used at the University 
of Bristol as the basis for a major coursework assignment in 
our Internet Economics and Financial Technology unit: the 
unit was at that time assessed 50% by examination, and 50% 
by programming coursework where the students were 
required to submit a report on the design and implementation 
of a new trading agent for BSE. If students could not or did 
not want to think up their own trading agents, they were given 
the option of implementing the GD algorithm [15] which had 
deliberately not been implemented in BSE to leave open the 
opportunity of setting as an exercise for our students the task 
of writing an implementation of MGD. In some years we 
required the students’ trading agents to be sales traders, as 
defined above; in other years we required the trading agents 
to work as proprietary traders (usually referred to as a “prop 
traders” within the industry), i.e. to start with a pot of money, 
and to then buy and sell assets in the market with the intention 
of turning a profit on the sequence of transactions, such that, 
at the end of a market session, the automated prop trader 
could sell off its holdings of assets, add the cash resulting to 
the sale to any other cash still held in its pot, and hope to end 
up with more cash than it started with. The primary difference 
between a prop trader and a sales trader is that a sales trader 
works client orders that are delivered to it from an external 
source, whereas a prop trader is responsible for generating its 
own endogenous trading signals, deciding when to buy and 
when to sell; this makes it somewhat more challenging to 
arrive at a working algo strategy for prop traders.  
Over the years that we based the programming project on 
BSE a total of around 250 students used it, and it met with 
enthusiastic responses in end-of-module feedback (with one 
notable exception, a single unhappy student who described 
BSE in very negative terms; just going to prove that it is very 
difficult to do anything that keeps everyone happy). Many of 
our Bristol students whose first experience of trading in 
financial markets was gained working with BSE are now 
enjoying careers working for major investment banks and 
fund-management companies.  
IX. USING BSE IN RESEARCH 
BSE has served as the platform on which several of our 
masters-level students have based the work that they 
undertook for their final master’s thesis. Recent Bristol 
masters-theses [32, 4] have explored the use of “deep 
learning” neural networks (DLNNs: see e.g. [23, 25]) to 
investigate whether deep learning can be used to replicate the 
behavior of an adaptive trader in a market purely from 
observation of that trader’s actions in the market, and the 
client-orders that it is working. Promising early results with 
DLNN successfully replicating ZIP traders for live trading in 
BSE are reported in [5], with subsequent extensions and 
replications of this work in [17, 18]. Of particular note is [18] 
which successfully demonstrated the use of automated 
design/optimization techniques to create the DLNN 
architecture: in prior work [32, 4], the DLNN architecture 
(i.e., the number of layers in the network, and the number of 
units in each layer) was optimized by hand, in a process that 
was essentially trial-and-error with some educated 
guesswork; [18] showed that high-performing network 
architectures could be automatically discovered by standard 
machine-learning and optimization techniques, such as 
genetic algorithms. 
Most recently, [9] reports the use of BSE as the platform 
for running many hundreds of thousands of independent 
market experiments, exploring a result first reported in 2015 
by Vach [34]. Vach reported that whether Vytelingum’s AA 
strategy dominates GDX in an experiment is highly 
dependent on the way the experiment is structured, on the 
relative proportions of AA and other strategies in the 
experiment’s population of traders: put simply, AA had 
previously been identified in [35, 11] as the strategy that 
dominates all others, but Vach demonstrated that in fact 
whether GDX is dominated by AA or not depends on the 
specific proportion of the two trading strategies in the 
experiment. Sometimes AA wins; other times GDX wins. In 
[9], experiments are reported that vary the proportions of four 
trading strategies: AA, SHVR, ZIC, and ZIP, working with 
an equal number T of traders (buyers and sellers) in each 
experiment, varying the total population sizes P=2T from 
T=4 to 16, and systematically varying the ratio of 
AA:SHVR:ZIC:ZIP from 0:0:0:P, through all possible ratio 
combinations to the situation where the four strategies are 
represented equally with ratio (P/4):(P/4):(P/4):(P/4), and 
then on through all other combinations, ending at the ratio 
P:0:0:0. The combinatorics of such an experiment are quite 
explosive, and the need to generate statistically rigorous 
results mean that at any one ratio, for any one T, it is desirable 
to perform a large number N of independently repeated trials: 
N=100 is a safely high value, but this means that any one 
experiment, working through all ratios for each T, and 
working through a reasonable range of T values, can require 
hundreds of thousands of trials (i.e., individual market 
sessions) to be performed for any one SDS. Varying across a 
reasonable number of qualitatively different SDSs can take 
the total number of trials required, the total number of 
independent market sessions simulated on BSE for one 
experiment, beyond one million. Thankfully, with the use of 
cloud computing services now commonplace, such large 
numbers of trials can be distributed over multiple (virtual) 
machines, because each trial is statistically independent from 
all the others. The results presented in [9] confirm Vach’s 
findings: whether AA dominates other strategies or not does 
indeed seem to be heavily reliant on the specific ratios of the 
different strategies present in the market, and on the nature of 
the SDS used in the market experiment. And, for this reason, 
AA can no longer be described as the strategy that dominates 
all others. See [9] for further details.   
It is perhaps no surprise that when running hundreds of 
thousands of BSE market trials, the size of the data files that 
result are substantial: many gigabytes. It’s worth noting that, 
in principle, public repositories like GitHub can be used not 
only to publish open-source code, but also to make large data-
files open for inspection, validation, and re-analysis by other 
researchers. In this way, BSE offer the opportunity to serve 
as a common public platform for running experiments that 
study automated trading technology and market 
microstructure.      
The list of order types given in Section III will come as 
no surprise to anyone familiar with the development of 
electronic markets over the past 20 years, but it is worth 
noting that much of the AI/Agents research on trading 
strategies seems stuck in the methodological mind-set of 
Smith’s initial experiments from more than half a century 
ago, developing trading agents that are limited to issuing 
MKT and LIM orders; a point explored in more depth in [9]. 
X. CONCLUSION 
BSE was initially designed for teaching masters-level 
computer science students about financial technology, 
specifically automated trading systems and the internal 
workings of contemporary financial exchanges. In the six 
years since it was first made available on GitHub it has 
proven to be a useful resource, and many University of 
Bristol graduates whose first encounter with fintech was via 
BSE have since gone on to successful careers in major 
investment banks and fund-management companies. BSE’s 
level of realism is sufficiently high that it can also be used as 
a platform for research experiments. Coupled with the ready 
availability of elastically scalable cloud-computing 
resources, it is now perfectly feasible to run many hundreds 
of thousands of market experiments in only a few hours, and 
hence to explore wide volumes of parameter space. Results 
from experiments run on BSE can be readily checked and 
independently repeated/replicated by other researchers 
around the world, with BSE thereby having the potential to 
become a common public-domain platform not only for 
teaching but also for research exploring issues in automated 
trading and market microstructure.  
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